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JIGSAW Committee

18 January 1950

Secretary

Statement on the Canvass of Completed and Planned Intelligence  
Projects on Communism

1. When the Committee decided to have the Secretary undertake a survey of completed and planned intelligence projects on Communism, a suitable form for a questionnaire was developed, approved by the Chairman and sent out to the members of the Committee. The survey was to be agency-wide; external research projects were also to be taken in consideration.

2. The Interim JIGSAW Committee had concluded its own canvass by July 1948. Therefore, it was decided that the new survey should begin 1 August 1948 and, for the purpose of this particular canvass, end on 1 September 1949. Reference was made to the fact that this canvass should be the beginning of a new project card file to be made available to the Committee; therefore it was requested that the agencies continue to submit monthly reports on Communism projects planned, prepared, or completed. To date, this request has been largely ignored.

3. The total number of cards received is 179. Of these, 9 are Top Secret and are not quoted. Top Secret projects were eliminated and so were a few titles which did not seem pertinent to the particular interests of the JIGSAW Committee. A number of other titles

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have been mentioned under several headings in the table of titles. There are 25 external research projects. In order to give the Committee an over-all concept of the type of projects reported on the questionnaires, a table of titles has been prepared and is available to the members of the Committee.

4. The majority of the questionnaires were returned to the Secretary's office by the latter part of October; the remainder arrived in mid-November. It was noted, however, that in a number of cases, no description of the project had been given and that most descriptions were not adequate to permit a near-correct assessment of the documents in question. The Secretary did not request all the completed papers for purposes of conducting a scientific analysis. Such analysis would have meant the study of 179 documents. Consequently, the Secretary could only draw certain conclusions from the partially completed questionnaires and such inferences must, of necessity, remain superficial.

5. In addition to the comparative inconclusiveness as to the value of US Government projects, there was also little information available on external research projects. At the time of the survey, only a few projects came to the attention of the Secretary and those had not been completed. This is also true of the projects of the semi-governmental Rand Corporation which has since completed a number of studies.

6. It would, of course, be possible to conduct a scientific survey of intelligence production on Communism if there were at the Committee's disposal a group of analysts who, for an extensive period, would devote their entire time to the study of available documents and then evaluate

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them in relation to the JIGSAW program. Since the Secretary cannot assume that he would have the means to carry out such a project at this time, he suggests that research in and systematic analysis of available intelligence be limited to those topics which are considered for production. In other words, when an agency intends to initiate the production of a paper on a particular aspect of Communism, its analysts should consult the card file to find out what has already been produced in this field or what is in production, and then study the pertinent papers to avoid repetition, duplication, and waste of research invested in such studies.

7. In looking through the project cards, both the Secretary and Dr. Price, a member of the Sub-Committee, while realizing that their inferences were ~~of~~ necessary<sup>it</sup> superficial, came to the following tentative conclusions:

(1) The field most thoroughly covered appears to be that of national Communist parties; but the variety of approach requires more systematic coordination as suggested under III-A of the Sub-Committee Report.

(2) A great number of studies are political documents which are treating Communism as a marginal rather than a principal problem.

(3) There has been little over-all coordination and, in consequence, much over-lapping and duplication exists in such prominent fields as, for example, Communism in China.

(4) There appears to be no methodical coverage, but rather an impression of isolated projects, undertaken whenever or wherever they were requested and, in this connection, few attempts were

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State's "Potentials of World Communism", to blend the varied aspects of Communism into an integrated whole. Instead, most studies deal with special problems.

(5) Basically, to sum up, the entire field of intelligence on Communism appears to be in great need of methodical investigation, comprehensiveness, and coordination along the lines suggested in the Sub-Committee Report of 5 January 1950. There are comparatively few documents available which fill the needs of national intelligence in this field and most of those are individual projects, un-coordinated with respect to substantive as well as to administrative aspects.

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